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INTRODUCTION

The Illinois Supreme Court decided several issues of civil procedure during the Survey period. The court considered questions
pertaining to statutes of limitations,' jurisdiction, 2 standing,3 forum
non conveniens, 4 conflicts of law,' pleadings and process,6 writs of
mandamus, 7 statutory construction, 8 appeals, 9 settlements and
contribution,' 0 and amicus briefs."
Several legislative changes were made during the Survey period. 12 The changes made affected service of process, confidentiality of medical information, and statutes of limitations. This Article
is intended to review changes in civil procedure by highlighting
significant cases, rules, and statutes. In addition, this Article will
briefly explain the potential impact that these changes will have.
II.

STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND REPOSE

A.

Applicability

Section 13-214(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure ' 3 pro1. See infra notes 13-62 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 63-127 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 128-57 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 166-75 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 176-99 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 200-18 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 219-31 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 232-77 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 278-95 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 296-304 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 305-28 and accompanying text.
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13- 2 14 (a) (1983) (amended 1985). The amendment changed the limitation period from two to four years. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 110, para.
13-214(a) (1985).
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vides a two year statute of limitations for all actions in tort or contract involving construction projects. The Illinois Supreme Court
recently considered whether section 13-214(a) is applicable to an
express warranty that was given prior to the statute's effective date.
In Stelzer v. Matthews Roofing Co. ,4 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that retroactive application of section 13-214 would impair
the plaintiffs' contractual rights. 5 In Stelzer, the defendant allegedly breached a ten-year written guarantee concerning the installation of a roof.16 Pursuant to section 13-214(a), the circuit court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the
complaint was filed more than two years after the plaintiffs discovered the defective roof. 7 The appellate court found that the plaintiffs' cause of action was timely because it was brought within the
time provided for in the contract and, therefore, the appellate court
reversed, holding that section 13-214 did not bar the action."
The Illinois Supreme Court held that retroactive application of
section 13-214 would impair the plaintiffs' pre-existing contractual
rights. 19 In analyzing section 13-214, the court noted that the legislature was concerned with the impairment of express warranties,
promises, and guarantees.2" The court determined that the language of section 13-214(d) 2 ' effectively provides that the statute of
limitations and period of repose for actions on express warranties
or promises is the term provided for by the warranty or promise if
that term is more than twelve years.22 Although the legislature did
not discuss the effect of section 13-214(d) on express warranties or
14. 117 Ill. 2d 186, 511 N.E.2d 421 (1987).
15. Id. at 190, 511 N.E.2d at 423.
16. Id. at 187, 511 N.E.2d at 421.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 190, 511 N.E.2d at 423.
20. Id. at 190, 511 N.E.2d at 422.
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214(d) (1983). Paragraph 13-214(d) states:
"Subsection (b) shall not prohibit any action against a defendant who has expressly warranted or promised the improvement to real property for a longer period from being
brought within that period." Id. Paragraph 13-214(b) provides in part:
No action based upon tort, contract or otherwise ... may be brought... for
an act or omission... in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction ... after twelve years have elapsed from the time of
such act or omission. However, any person who discovers such act or omission
prior to the expiration of such act or omission shall in no event have less than
two years to bring an action as provided in subsection (a) of this section.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214(b) (1983) (amended 1985). The amendment
changed the 12-year limitation to 10 years and the two-year limitation to four years. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214(b) (1985).
22. Stelzer, 117 Ill. 2d at 190, 511 N.E.2d at 423.
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promises less than twelve years and entered into before section 13214 became effective, the court reasoned that section 13-214(d)
must be read to allow such a cause of action to be brought within
the express term of a guarantee of less than twelve years.23 The
court noted that any other construction of section 13-214 would
require a party to bring an action within two years of discovering
the defect, thereby impairing pre-existing contractual rights.24
The court, therefore, concluded that the plaintiffs' action was
timely under the statute because it was filed within the term of the
defendant's guarantee.25
B.

Rule 103(b) and Refiling

Rule 103(b) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 26 requires
that a plaintiff exercise due diligence in effecting service of process. 27 Failure to diligently serve process after the expiration of the
statute of limitations may result in the dismissal of the case with
prejudice. 28 In addition, section 13-217 of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure 29 provides that if an action is voluntarily dismissed by
the plaintiff, then the plaintiff has one year to refile the action or
the remainder of the period of limitation, whichever is greater.3 °
In Muskat v. Sternberg,3 ' the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
a plaintiff's lack of due diligence in serving process in a suit that
had been dismissed for want of prosecution could be considered
when the suit is refiled under section 13-217 and a motion to dismiss is denied under rule 103(b).32 In Muskat, the plaintiff filed a
complaint one day prior to the expiration of the statute of limita23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 191, 511 N.E.2d at 423.
26. ILL. S. CT. R. 103(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1lOA, para. 103(b) (1987). Rule
103(b) states:
If the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service prior to the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the action as a whole or as to
any unserved defendant may be dismissed without prejudice. If the failure to
exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service occurs after the expiration of the
applicable statute of limitations, the dismissal shall be with prejudice. In either
case the dismissal shall be made on the application of any defendant or on the
court's own motion.
Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1987).
30. Id.
31. 122 Ill. 2d 41, 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988).
32. Id. at 49, 521 N.E.2d at 935.
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tions. 33 Two years after the complaint was filed, the suit was dismissed for want of prosecution.34 During the two years, the
plaintiff did not attempt to serve process on any of the
defendants. 35
One year after the dismissal, the plaintiff refiled her complaint
pursuant to section 13-217 and she served the defendant with process. 36 The defendants then moved to dismiss the refiled suit under
rule 103(b), alleging that the plaintiff lacked due diligence in serving process. 37 The circuit court denied the defendants' motion,
finding that the proper period for determining whether the plaintiff
exercised due diligence began with the refiling of the lawsuit and
that the plaintiff refiled the lawsuit in a timely manner. 38 The appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.3 9
The Illinois Supreme Court held that, in ruling on a pending
rule 103(b) motion when the plaintiff has refiled an action under
section 13-217, a trial court may consider the plaintiff's lack of
reasonable diligence in serving process in the first suit or in the
41
refiled suit.' The supreme court also found Catlett v. Novak
controlling.42 In applying O'Connell and Catlett, the Muskat court
held that the trial court must apply rule 103(b) accordingly, regardless of whether the dismissal was voluntary or for want of
prosecution and the plaintiff refiles under section 13-217. 43
The court's rule makes evident sense; otherwise, a plaintiff
would be wise to move for a nonsuit and re-file the case when he
has not been diligent in effecting service. The court has taken the
view that a plaintiff may not attempt to circumvent the effect of the
court's rules without a price. The rule in Muskat punishes dilatory
33. Id. at 43, 521 N.E.2d at 933.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 44, 521 N.E.2d at 933.
40. Id. at 45, 521 N.E.2d at 933 (citing O'Connell v. St. Francis Hosp., 112 Ill. 2d
273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986)). For a discussion of O'Connell,see Kandaras & Wozniak,
Civil Procedure, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 317, 319-21 (1986).
41. 116 Ill. 2d 63, 506 N.E.2d 586 (1987).
42. Muskat, 122 Ill. 2d at 48, 521 N.E.2d at 935. In Catlett, the supreme court affirmed O'Connell even though one of the defendants in Catlett had not been served and
did not file a motion to dismiss in the first suit. Catlett, 116 Ill. 2d at 65-66, 596 N.E.2d
at 588. The Catlett court remanded the case to the circuit court for a rule 103(b) hearing
and directed the court to consider the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's service of
process in the original suit and the refiled suit. Id. at 70-71, 586 N.E.2d at 590.
43. Muskat, 122 Ill. 2d at 49, 521 N.E.2d at 935.
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tactics. The court's opinion, therefore, will have a salutary effect
upon all litigation.
C. Refiling After Voluntary Dismissal
In Gendek v. Jehangir," the Illinois Supreme Court held that,
pursuant to section 13-217,11 a plaintiff is permitted to refile an
action only once following a voluntary dismissal.46 In Gendek, the
plaintiff, in one of two consolidated matters, filed a complaint in an
Indiana state court eight days before the statute of limitations expired. Approximately two months later, the plaintiff requested
and was granted a voluntary dismissal.48 Shortly thereafter, the
plaintiff refiled the action in a federal court.49 The plaintiff later
moved to dismiss the case without prejudice because there was no
subject matter jurisdiction, and the court granted the motion. 50
Within one year of the voluntary dismissal, the plaintiff refiled the
action in an Illinois state court.5" The circuit court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice.5 2 The appellate
court affirmed.53
In the second consolidated case, the plaintiff filed a complaint
for damages from an accident that occurred in September 1977.14
In February 1984, the plaintiff's motion for a voluntary dismissal
was granted.55 The plaintiff refiled the action on the same day that
the voluntary dismissal was granted. 56 In April 1986, the plaintiff
57
again filed a motion for voluntary dismissal which was granted.
In May 1986, the plaintiff filed a new action.58 The defendant's
motion to dismiss with prejudice was granted and the appellate
court affirmed.59
The supreme court determined that section 13-217 does not allow more than one refiling after a voluntary dismissal if the statute
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

119 Ill. 2d 338, 518 N.E.2d 1051 (1988).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1987).
Gendek, 119 Ill. 2d at 343-44, 518 N.E.2d at 1053.
Id. at 339, 518 N.E.2d at 1051.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 339-40, 518 N.E.2d at 1051.
Id. at 340, 518 N.E.2d at 1051.
Id.
Id. at 340, 518 N.E.2d at 1051-52.
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of limitations has elapsed. 60 Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to refile an action no more than one time after taking a voluntary dismissal. 61 The court decided that to allow a plaintiff to refile more
than once would permit plaintiffs to repeat filings and dismissals
involving identical actions in order to avoid the statute of
limitations.62

The Gendek opinion, as with Muskat, represents an intelligent
effort on the part of the supreme court to prevent tactical maneuvering that does nothing toward resolving litigation. While the
ability to take a non-suit certainly has great utility, the practice has
been abused. Some attorneys and litigants use a voluntary non-suit
as a remedy when they have failed to prepare or when they refuse
to accept defeat on the merits. The Gendek decision makes clear
that the Illinois General Assembly did not intend voluntary nonsuits to have such a result and that the court will not interpret
section 13-217 to allow multiple refilings for such ends. Incidentally, the same result should occur if there is one non-suit and one
dismissal for want of prosecution or two dismissals for want of
prosecution, and re-filings take place.
II.

A.

JURISDICTION

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Section 2-619(a)(1) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 63 allows dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.'M Section 2-619(a)(3) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 65
permits dismissal of a complaint if there is another action pending
between the parties for the same cause.66
In Ransom v. Marrese,67 the Illinois Supreme Court held that an
Illinois circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over a matter
even though the plaintiff did not comply with Indiana statutory
60. Id. at 343, 518 N.E.2d at 1053.
61. Id. at 343-44, 518 N.E.2d at 1053.
62. Id at 343, 518 N.E.2d at 1053.
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-619(a)(1) (1987).
64. Id. Paragraph 2-619(a)(1) provides that a motion to dismiss must be supported by
an affidavit "[t]hat the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action,
provided the defect cannot be removed by a transfer of the case to a court having jurisdiction." Id.
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-619(a)(3) (1987).
66. Id. Section 2-619(a)(3) provides that a motion to dismiss must be supported by an
affidavit "[t]hat there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause." Id.
67. 122 Ill.
2d 518, 524 N.E.2d 555 (1988).
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filing procedures 6 and there was not another action pending between the parties for the same cause.69 In Ransom, the plaintiff
received medical treatment from the defendant doctor in Indiana.7 °
Approximately one year after her hospitalization, the plaintiff filed
a proposed complaint with the Indiana Insurance Commissioner,
pursuant to the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act (the
,,IMMA,,).71

After the plaintiff filed the proposed complaint, the defendant
moved to Illinois and the plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint
against the defendant in an Illinois circuit court, alleging negligence and misrepresentation.7 2 The defendant moved to dismiss
the Illinois complaint pursuant to sections 2-619(a)(1) and 2619(a)(3) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.73 The circuit
court found that because the plaintiff did not fully comply with the
IMMA, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction."4 In addition,
the circuit court determined that there was another pending action
the circuit
between the same parties in Indiana. 75 Accordingly,
76
dismiss.
to
motion
defendant's
the
granted
court
The appellate court reversed, finding that the section 2-619(a)(1)
dismissal was improper because the Indiana medical review procedure did not apply to actions brought outside of the Indiana
courts.77 Additionally, the appellate court found that because the
IMMA provision was procedural, rather than substantive, an Illinois court was not required to apply Indiana's procedural rules. 78
The appellate court also held that the filing of the proposed complaint to the review panel in Indiana did not constitute another
thus, dismissal was not appropriate under
pending "action" and,
79
section 2-619(a)(3).
The Illinois Supreme Court determined that a section 268. Id. at 526, 524 N.E.2d at 559.
69. Id. at 530, 524 N.E.2d at 560.
70. Id. at 519, 524 N.E.2d at 555-56.
71. Id. at 519, 524 N.E.2d at 556 (citing IND. CODE. ANN. § 16-9.5-1 (Bums 1984)).
Section 16-9.5-9-2 provides: "No action against a health care provider may be commenced in any court of this state before the claimant's proposed complaint has been
presented to a medical review panel established pursuant to this chapter and an opinion is
rendered by the panel." IND. CODE. ANN. § 16-9.5-9-2 (Bums 1984).
72. Ransom, 122 Ill. 2d at 520, 524 N.E.2d at 556.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 521, 524 N.E.2d at 556.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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619(a)(1) dismissal was improper because the clear language of the
IMMA limited the medical review panel opinion requirement to
actions filed only in Indiana. 80 Specifically, the court reasoned that
because the IMMA itself limits the panel procedure to "any court
of this State," an Illinois court would not be bound by the procedure. 8 In addition, the court determined that a dismissal under
section 2-619(a)(3) was improper because the filing of notice to a2
8
medical review panel does not constitute a judicial proceeding.
The court reasoned that there was no judicial proceeding because
members of the review panel do not conduct hearings or trials or
give judgments on the merits and, therefore, panel members are
not judicial officers.8 3 In addition, the court concluded that the
complaint filed in Illinois was not a duplicate of the proposed complaint.84 Accordingly, the court concluded that there was not "another action" pending under 2-619(a)(3). 5
The court's opinion should not be interpreted too broadly. The
court relied rather heavily upon the statutory language limiting the
panel procedure to "any court of this State [Indiana]." Such a rule
comports with sound statutory construction and does not signify
the expansion of the court's power to hear and decide a case.
B.

Judicial Review and Authority

The Illinois Supreme Court considered several cases during the
Survey period regarding issues of judicial review. In Board of Education v. Compton, 6 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act 8 7 (the "IELRA") does not

88
permit circuit courts to review education arbitration awards.
Compton involved a teacher who was terminated by the Board of
Education (the "Board") allegedly in violation of a collective bar80. Id. at 527, 524 N.E.2d at 558-59. See supra note 71 for text of section 16-9.5-9-2.
81. Id. at 525, 524 N.E.2d at 558-59.
82. Id. at 529, 524 N.E.2d at 560.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 530, 524 N.E.2d at 560-61.
85. Id. at 529, 524 N.E.2d at 560.
86. 123 Il. 2d 216, 526 N.E.2d 149 (1988).
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1701 (1987). Paragraph 1701 states:
It is the public policy of this State and the purpose of this Act to promote
orderly and constructive relationships between all educational employees and
their employers. Unresolved disputes between the educational employees and
their employers are injurious to the public, and the General Assembly is therefore aware that adequate means must be established for minimizing them and
providing for their resolution.
Id.
88.

Compton, 123 Ill. 2d at 221, 526 N.E.2d at 152.
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gaining agreement. 89 The teacher subsequently filed a grievance,
and the matter was submitted to an arbitrator.9 0 The arbitrator's
binding decision ordered reinstatement of the teacher and back
wages and benefits. 9 The Board then petitioned the circuit court
to have the arbitrator's decision vacated. 92 The circuit court
granted the Board's motion for summary judgment and vacated
the award. 93 The appellate court reversed, holding that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to rule on an arbitration award because
only the Illinois Education Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction
over such matters.9 4
The Illinois Supreme Court found no provision in the IELRA
that permits a circuit court to rule on an arbitration award. 95 Furthermore, the court noted that the IELRA's outline for procedures
regarding labor practice provides that the decisions of the Board
are subject to review only by appellate courts. 96 The court concluded that the legislature did not intend for the circuit courts to
review these arbitration awards or disputes concerning arbitrability. 97 The court held that it was solely the Board's responsibility to adjudicate the merits of arbitration awards in the first

instance.9"
The Illinois Supreme Court also considered the issue of judicial
review of medical staff membership decisions. In Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital,99 the supreme court held that a private
hospital's decision regarding the admission of a physician to its
staff is not subject to judicial review. °° In Barrows, the plaintiff
89. Id. at 218, 526 N.E.2d at 150.
90. Id. A collective bargaining agreement required that all grievances concerning the
evaluation and termination of teachers be submitted to arbitration. Id. at 218, 526
N.E.2d at 150.
91. Id. at 218-19, 526 N.E.2d at 150-51.
92. Id. at 219, 526 N.E.2d at 151.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 221, 526 N.E.2d at 152.
96. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1716(a) (1985)). Paragraph 1716(a)
provides that the decision of the Board is subject to review "to the Appellate Court of a
judicial district in which the Board maintains its principal office." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
48, para. 1716(a) (1987).
97. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d at 221-22, 526 N.E.2d at 152. In addition, the court noted
several problems that might arise if circuit courts were to have jurisdiction over these
matters. Id. at 222, 526 N.E.2d at 152. Specifically, the court noted that problems would
arise concerning advance knowledge of where a suit should be brought, the possibility of
conflicting judgments, and forum shopping. Id.
98. Id. at 226, 526 N.E.2d at 154.
99. 123 Ill. 2d 49, 525 N.E.2d 50 (1988).
100. Id. at 59, 525 N.E.2d at 55.
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brought an action challenging a hospital's decision to deny him
medical staff membership.101 The plaintiff's complaint alleged that
as a matter of public policy, a hospital's denial of staff membership
should be reviewable. °2 The circuit court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on two Illinois appellate
court decisions that held that staff membership decisions are not
reviewable. °3 The appellate court reversed, holding private hospital hiring decisions may be reviewed as a matter of public policy."0
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that even though it had not
yet reviewed the issue presented, the "rule of nonreview" had been
applied generally by Illinois courts. 105 The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the modern trend of the courts is to allow
hospital staff decisions to be reviewed. 0 6 Instead, the court found
that a majority of states do not permit review of these decisions. 1o
The court held that as a matter of public policy in Illinois, private hospitals' staff membership decisions are not subject to judicial review. 108 The court noted that the Illinois General Assembly,
in amending the Medical Practice Act"° and the Hospital Licens101. Id. at 50, 525 N.E.2d at 51.
102. Id. at 51, 525 N.E.2d at 51.
103. Id. The circuit court relied on Jain v. Northwest Community Hospital, 67 Ill.
App. 3d 420, 385 N.E.2d 108 (1st Dist. 1978), and Mauer v. Highland Park Hospital
Foundation, 90 Ill. App. 2d 409, 232 N.E.2d 776 (2d Dist. 1967).
104. Barrows, 123 Ill. 2d at 50, 525 N.E.2d at 50.
105. Id. The rule of "non-review" was first established in Mauer, 90 Ill. App. 2d at
412-13, 232 N.E.2d at 778.
106. Barrows, 123 Ill. 2d at 52, 525 N.E.2d at 52.
107. Id. at 52-53, 525 N.E.2d at 52. The court also found that the case relied on by
the plaintiff, Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital, 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963), involved
special circumstances that did not apply to the case on review. Barrows, 123 Ill. 2d at 53,
525 N.E.2d at 52. The court distinguished Greisman on several grounds. First, according to the Barrows court, the defendant-hospital in Greisman was the only hospital in the
area where the plaintiff-doctor practiced and, therefore, the plaintiff's patients would be
deprived of his care if he was not given staff privileges. Id. at 53-54, 525 N.E.2d at 53. In
addition, the hospital's decision would have a negative economic impact on the plaintiff's
practice because there were no other hospitals near the doctor's place of residence. Id.
The Barrows court noted that New Jersey subsequently extended Greisman by eliminating economic impact as a basis for judicial review of hospital staff decisions. Id. at 55,
525 N.E.2d at 53. Thus, New Jersey adopted a "pure" public policy position that permitted review of hospital staff decisions. Id. Yet, the Barrows court noted that the New
Jersey decisions were made prior to Illinois appellate court decisions. Id. Furthermore,
the court noted that there were a limited number of jurisdictions that followed New
Jersey's position. Id. at 55-56, 525 N.E.2d at 53-54. The Barrows court stated that New
Jersey's position allows for review of private hospital decision based on the hospitals'
"quasi-public fiduciary status." Id. at 55, 525 N.E.2d at 53. See generally Note, Michigan
Court Joins Majority in Denying JudicialReview of Staffing Decisions of Private Hospitals,
6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 339 (1982).
108. Barrows, 123 Ill.
2d at 59, 525 N.E.2d at 55.
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, para. 4406 (1987).
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ing Act," l0 included provisions that grant immunity to hospitals
and their staffs from civil liability for service on peer review or
credential committees."' The court found that these statutes,
although not dispositive of the present issue, reveal a legislative
intent to permit hospitals and medical staffs to exercise freely their
discretion in selecting and retaining medical staff members. " 2 Additionally, the court found that the Illinois Health Finance Reform
Act" 3 provides a disclaimer that clearly indicates the legislature's
intent on the issue.'
Accordingly, the supreme court refused to
accept the appellate court's policy claim." 5
The court's opinion in Barrows is consistent with the legislative
trend to maintain, as confidential, hospital decisions made with regard to policing medical staffs. The Medical Studies Act along
with the recent amendments to the Medical Practice Act and the
Hospital Licensing Act shield hospitals from disclosing efforts to
improve health care, whether the efforts include new procedures or
revoking staff privileges. The Illinois General Assembly has expressed the view that the improvement of health care supersedes
the interests of physicians on staff who believe that their privileges
have been wrongfully suspended or revoked. It should be pointed
out, however, that the in-house procedures at most hospitals do
allow for several levels of review of decisions regarding staff
privileges.
In addition to the above cases concerning the scope of judicial
authority, the supreme court considered its authority over circuit
court rules. In People ex rel Brazen v. Finley," 6 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a circuit court is without authority to
promulgate a rule that imposes requirements that are stricter than
the supreme court's rules.I " In Brazen, the plaintiff, an attorney,
sought to file a petition of dissolution of marriage for his client
with the clerk of the circuit court." 8 Because an affidavit of com110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 151.2 (1987).
111. Barrows, 123 I11.2d at 57-58, 525 N.E.2d at 54-55.
112. Id. at 58, 525 N.E.2d at 55.
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 6501-1 (1987).
114. Barrows, 123 I11. 2d at 58-59, 525 N.E.2d at 55 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111,
para 6503-4 (1987)). Paragraph 6503-4 provides in part: "It is not the intent of the
General Assembly, nor shall it be the policy of the State of Illinois, to take from medical
staffs and hospitals the determination as to the qualifications of practitioners for purposes
of granting medical staff membership and privileges." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para
6503-4 (1987).
115. Barrows, 123 I11.2d at 59, 525 N.E.2d at 54-55.
116. 119 Ill. 2d 485, 519 N.E.2d 898 (1988).
117. Id. at 495, 519 N.E.2d at 903.
118. Id. at 488, 519 N.E.2d at 899.
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pliance with ethical rules was not attached to the petition, as required by Circuit Court Rule 0.7,9 the clerk refused to accept the
petition.1 20 The appellate court reversed the circuit court's dismissal of the complaint, finding that rule 0.7 violated Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 21.121

The defendant contended that rule 0.7 did not conflict with any
Illinois Supreme Court Rule and that the supreme court does not
preempt the circuit court's authority to create rules regarding attorney conduct and discipline. 22 The Illinois Supreme Court determined that even though the circuit courts have some power to
make rules, they do not have the power to change substantive
law. 123 Furthermore, the court found that circuit court rules are
subject to review by the supreme court and may not conflict with
the supreme court's rules. ' 24 The court then cited its decision in In
re Mitan 125 for the proposition that the supreme court, not the circuit court, has the authority to regulate and discipline attorney
conduct. 26 Accordingly, the court held that rule 0.7 invaded the
supreme court's exclusive regulatory and disciplinary authority
119. COOK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT RULE 0.7. Rule 0.7 provides in part:
(a) The unethical solicitation of employment by or on behalf of any attorney
and the payment of commissions, living expenses or other gratuities in connection with such employment is prohibited.
(b) The Affidavit of Compliance with this rule is required in all criminal, quasi
criminal, traffic, personal injury and domestic relations actions and shall be in
the form furnished by the clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
(c) The affidavit shall be filed by counsel when an appearance or initial pleading is filed.
(d) Pleadings unaccompanied by such an affidavit shall not be accepted by the
clerk.
Id.
120. Brazen, 119 Ill. 2d at 488, 519 N.E.2d at 899.
121. Id. at 490, 519 N.E.2d at 900 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 21(a)
(1983)). Rule 21(a) provides for the adoption of circuit court rules and statutes that are
consistent with state rules and statutes, provided that they are uniform throughout the
state. Id.
In addition, the appellate court found that Rule 0.7 conflicted with Rules 2-103 and 5103 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Brazen, 119 Ill. 2d at 409, 519 N.E.2d at
900 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch I10A, paras. 2-103, 5-103 (1983)). Rule 2-103 concerns

an attorney's communications with prospective clients. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para.
2-103 (1987). Rule 5-103 concerns an attorney's gaining a proprietary interest in a case
that he is handling. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 5-103 (1987).
122. Brazen, 119 Ill. 2d at 490-91, 519 N.E.2d at 900-01.
123. Id. at 491, 519 N.E.2d at 901 (citing Kinsley v. Kinsley, 388 Ill. 194, 197, 57
N.E.2d 449, 450 (1944)).
124. Id. (citing People ex rel. Bernat v. Bicek, 405 Ill. 510, 521-22, 91 N.E.2d 588,
594 (1950)).
125. 119 Ill. 2d 229, 518 N.E.2d 1000 (1987).

126.

Brazen, 119 Ill. 2d at 492-93, 519 N.E.2d at 901-02.
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substantive hardships

on

STANDING AND MOOTNESS

In Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 21 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that in order to establish standing, a plaintiff
129
must show that a legally cognizable interest has been damaged.
Accordingly, the court refused to adopt the defendant's proposed
"zone of interest" test for standing when an administrative agency
allegedly violates a statute. 30
In Greer, several persons who owned property near a proposed
housing project filed a claim against the Illinois Housing Development Authority (the "IHDA").'' The plaintiffs alleged that the
IHDA approval of assisted mortgage financing for the project vio132
lated IHDA's duty under the Illinois Housing Act (the "IHA") 13 3
to avoid "undue economic homogeneity" in its financed projects.
The IHDA asserted that to have standing, a party must demonstrate that he was injured in fact and that his interest lay within the
zone of interest that the statute in question seeks to protect. 134 The
IHDA then argued 35that the plaintiffs failed to meet both of the
test's requirements.
The supreme court refused to adopt the IHDA's "zone of interest" rule because it would require the court to examine the IHA's
goals, purposes, and objectives and then decide whether the plaintiffs were intended to benefit from the IHA. 36 This analysis, the
court found, would confuse the standing issue and the actual merits of the case. 1 The court then determined that in order to have
standing, a party must demonstrate only that there was an injury
127. Id. at 494, 519 N.E.2d at 902.
128. 122 Ill. 2d 462, 524 N.E.2d 561 (1988).
129. Id. at 492, 524 N.E.2d at 574-75 (citing Glazewski v. Coronet Ins. Co., 108 I11.
2d 243, 254, 483 N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (1985)).
130. Id. at 491, 524 N.E.2d at 574. The "zone of interest" test requires that the
plaintiff's asserted interest be within the zone of interests that the applicable statute seeks
to protect. Id. at 487, 524 N.E.2d at 572. For further discussion of the "zone of interest"
test, see Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 155-56 (1970).
131. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 470, 524 N.E.2d at 564.
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 301 (1987).
133. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 470, 524 N.E.2d at 564.
134. Id. at 487, 524 N.E.2d at 572. IHDA also set forth defenses of non-reviewability
and failure to state a claim that its activities were arbitrary and capricious. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 492, 524 N.E.2d at 574.
137. Id.
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in fact to a legally cognizable interest. 138 In order to prove an injury in fact, the plaintiff must show that the injury was "distinct
and palpable,"' 139 "fairly traceable,"'" and "substantially likely to
be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief."1 4 '
The court found that the decrease in the plaintiffs' property
value was a legally cognizable interest. 142 In addition, the court
noted that because the plaintiffs' homes were close to the development project, the injury was "distinct and palpable," as opposed to
a being a generalized, public grievance.' 43 In addition, the court
found that a decrease in the value of the plaintiffs' homes would be
44
"fairly traceable" to IHDA's approval of the project financing.'
45
Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs had standing.'
In People ex rel Bernardi v. City of Highland Park, 46 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' appeal was not moot, even
though the injunctions sought were too late to have an effect. '4 In
Bernardi,the Illinois Department of Labor filed a complaint to enjoin the City of Highland Park ("Highland Park") from awarding
a public works contract without first complying with section 11 of
the Prevailing Wage Act ("the PWA").' 4s The circuit court dismissed the complaint, stating that Highland Park could choose not
to follow the PWA because it was a home rule unit.149 The appellate court affirmed.1 50
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, Highland Park dis138. Id. at 492, 524 N.E.2d at 574-75 (citing Glazewski v. Coronet Ins. Co., 108 Ill.
2d 243, 254, 483 N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (1985)).
139. Id. at 493, 524 N.E.2d at 575 (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 375 (1982)).
140. Id. (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 261 (1977)).
141. Id. (quoting INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 936 (1983)).
142. Id. at 493, 524 N.E.2d at 575.
143. Id. at 494, 524 N.E.2d at 575.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 494-95, 524 N.E.2d at 576. The court noted that the lack of standing is an
affirmative defense and that a plaintiff does not have the burden of pleading and proving
standing. Id. at 494, 524 N.E.2d at 575 (citing In re Custody of McCarthy, 157 Ill. App.
3d 377, 380, 510 N.E.2d 555, 556 (2d Dist. 1987)).
146. 121 Ill. 2d 1, 520 N.E.2d 316 (1988).
147. Id. at 6-7, 520 N.E.2d at 318.
148. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 39s-1 to 39s-12 (1987)). Section 11
provides in part: "Where objections to a determination of the prevailing rate of wages or
a court action relative thereto is pending, the public body shall not continue work on the
project unless sufficient funds are available to pay increased wages if such are finally
determined ...." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 39s-11 (1987).
149. Bernardi, 121 Ill. 2d at 6, 520 N.E.2d at 318.
150. Id.
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closed that the public works project at issue had been completed. "'1
Highland Park claimed that the injunction sought by the plaintiffs
could not be enforced and, therefore, the matter was moot." 2 The
supreme court determined that even though the injunctions would
have no effect, the appeal was not moot."53 The court noted that
although the appeal would not affect the completed event, the
court's decision could have a direct impact on the rights and duties
of the parties and, therefore, the appeal would stand. 154 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff's appeal was not moot because there was still a question involving rights and interests of the
parties. 115
Finally, the court noted that even if the appeal were moot, review would still be appropriate because exceptions exist to the general rule that cases that are moot are unreviewable."' 6 The court
stated that if an issue is likely to be repeated, then review may be
appropriate. 157
In both Greer and Highland Park, the court lucidly discussed
the rules governing each case. In Greer, rather than adopt a more
amorphous test which would merely obfuscate whether standing
was present, the court continued to apply the more readily recognizable test of an injury in fact. In Highland Park, the court refused to find mootness where a decision would assist the instant
parties and future parties similarly situated.
V.

FORUM NON CONVENIENS

In McClain v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co.,"' the Illinois

Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss based on forum non-conveniens. 19 In
McClain, the plaintiff was a Tennessee resident at the time he was
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 6-7, 520 N.E.2d at 318.
154. Id. The court determined that the decision would have an effect on the parties
because section 11 of the PWA contemplates litigation even after a project has been completed. Id. at 7, 520 N.E.2d at 319. Additionally, the court determined that its decision
would resolve the issue of whether or not the Director of the Department of Labor must
publish the names of Highland Park's contractors who did not comply with the PWA.
Id. at 8, 520 N.E.2d at 319.
155. Id. at 8, 520 N.E.2d at 319.
156. Id.
157. Id. Specifically, the court believed that the issue presented in this case should be
resolved for the concern of all public officials in the state who have to decide whether
they must obey the PWA. Id.
158. 121 Ill. 2d 278, 520 N.E.2d 368 (1988).
159. Id. at 292, 520 N.E.2d at 374.
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injured in Memphis, Tennessee. 160 The plaintiff subsequently filed
a complaint against the defendant in the Circuit Court of Madison
County, Illinois.' 6 1 In response, the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss based on forum non-conveniens. 162 The plaintiff noted that
after filing
the complaint, he became a resident of Madison
63
County.
The Illinois Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff who did not
live in Illinois at the time he was injured and who later moved to
Illinois does not have an expectation of protection from the State
of Illinois."6 Consequently, the court concluded that because the
plaintiff had moved to Madison County after the injury occurred
and the action was filed, any assumptions about convenience to the
parties was subject to closer scrutiny.' 65 The court's conclusion is
legally sound.
VI.

CONFLICTS OF LAW

Recently, the Supreme Court of Illinois considered the application of a foreign law when one non-resident spouse sues another
166
spouse for an injury that occurred in Illinois. In Nelson v. Hix,
the supreme court held that when one spouse sues the other spouse
in tort, the law of the couple's domicile at the time of the tortious
67
act applies. 1

In Nelson, the plaintiff filed a tort complaint seeking to recover
damages against her husband for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident in Illinois.' 68 The Illinois Supreme Court held that
160. Id. at 281-282, 520 N.E.2d at 369.
161. Id. at 282, 520 N.E.2d at 369.
162. Id. The defendant averred that the plaintiff was a resident of Tennessee, that all
of the witnesses were from Tennessee, that the physical evidence was in Memphis, that
the defendant could be served with process in Memphis, and that there were no other
witnesses in Illinois. Id. The defendant also noted that Madison County's court docket
was congested and that there would be great costs in transporting witnesses to Madison
County. Id.
163. Id. at 282-83, 520 N.E.2d at 369.
164. Id. at 290, 520 N.E.2d at 373.
165. Id. The court also noted that at the time the action was filed, there were no
significant ties to Madison County. Id. The court found that the convenience to the
plaintiffs in this case was outweighed by the inconvenience to other persons involved and
to the Circuit Court of Madison County. Id. at 291, 520 N.E.2d at 373. The court found
several factors that favored Memphis as the more convenient forum. Specifically, the
court determined, by considering the location of the accident, the residence of the injured
party and the location of the witnesses and evidence, that Shelby County was the more
convenient forum. Id. at 290, 520 N.E.2d at 373.
166. 122 Ill. 2d 343, 522 N.E.2d 1214 (1988).
167. Id. at 353, 522 N.E.2d at 1219.
168. Id. at 344, 522 N.E.2d at 1214-15. The plaintiff was a passenger in her hus-
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the law of the couple's domicile at the time of the tort controls
whether one spouse may sue the other in tort. 1 69 In addition, the
court noted that Illinois has little interest in regulating the rights of
foreign citizens to sue a spouse. 7 ' Furthermore, the court found
that Ontario's interest in regulating the family relationships of Ontario citizens outweighed Illinois' interest in an insurance carrier's
17
expectations. 1
Contrary to the defendant's argument, the court also concluded
that the doctrine of comity 72 does not require courts to recognize a
foreign law. 1 73 Instead, the court determined that comity allows a
court to decline application of a foreign law that is adverse to the
"public morals, natural justice or the general interest" of the citizens of Illinois.' 74 The court concluded that the Ontario law was
not clearly contrary to the public morals, natural justice, or general
interest of Illinois citizens and, therefore, refusal to follow Ontario
175
law was not justified.
band's car at the time of the collision. Id. at 344, 522 N.E.2d at 1214. Both the plaintiff
and her husband were residents and citizens of Ontario, Canada at the time of the accident. Id. The trial court granted the husband's motion to dismiss on the ground that the
plaintiff's claim against him was barred by Illinois' interspousal immunity statute. Id. at
345, 522 N.E.2d at 1215 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para 1001 (1983)). In so holding, the trial court found that Illinois law applied, rather than Canadian law which would
have permitted the action. Id.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed, finding that the law of marital domicile applied and, therefore, Ontario law was binding. Id. Pursuant to Ontario's Family Law
Reform Act, one spouse may sue another in tort. ONTARIO FAMILY LAW REFORM ACT,
ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 145, § 65(3)(a) (1980).

169. Nelson, 122 Ill. 2d at 348, 522 N.E.2d at 1216 (citing Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill.
2d 57, 59, 213 N.E.2d 544, 546 (1966)). In Wartell, the court adopted section 169 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, which provides that the law of a

couple's domicile will usually determine whether or not spousal immunity exists.
Wartell, 34 Ill. 2d at 59, 213 N.E.2d at 546; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 169 (1971).
170. Nelson, 122 Ill. 2d at 351, 522 N.E.2d at 1218.
171. Id.
172. The doctrine of judicial comity is defined as a "principle in accordance with
which the courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed. 1979).

173. Nelson, 122 Ill. 2d at 352, 522 N.E.2d at 1218.
174. Id. (quoting Wintersteen v. National Cooperage and Woodenware Co., 361 111.
95, 101, 197 N.E. 578, 582 (1935)).
175. Id. The court also noted that effective January 1, 1988, Illinois amended its law
to permit interspousal suits in tort. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1001 (1987).
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VII.

PLEADINGS AND PROCEEDINGS

A.

Sufficiency of Complaint

The Illinois Supreme Court decided two cases that required the
determination of whether or not a complaint should be dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action. In Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center,'76 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action
when the facts pleaded indicate that the defendant could not reasonably foresee the injury.' 7 7 In Kirk, the plaintiff filed a complaint against a hospital, two drug manufacturers, and two
physicians for injuries he sustained when a recently released patient, who had taken prescription drugs in the hospital, injured the
plaintiff while the plaintiff was a passenger in his car. 7 8 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause
the circuit court's disof action.' 79 The appellate court reversed
80
missal against five of the defendants.1
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that pleadings must be construed liberally so as to do justice between the parties.' 8 ' The court
stated, however, that a plaintiff is still required to set out the necessary facts for recovery under the theory alleged.' 82 The court
found that because the drug manufacturers could not have reasonably foreseen that the physicians would have dispensed drugs without a warning and that the patient would be discharged, drink
alcohol, lose control of his car, and hit a tree, the complaint failed
to state a cause of action. 8 3
It appears that the court was engaged in drawing a line as to the
outer limit of liability for doctors and hospitals. Given the climate
relative to increased malpractice premiums and other policy concerns, the court's line drawing cannot be viewed as arbitrary or
unreasonable.
In Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital,"4 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a complaint that does not allege that a
patient was involuntarily admitted to a hospital does not provide
the necessary facts to establish that the hospital has a duty to re176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987).
117 Ill.
Id. at 521, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
Id. at 513-14, 513 N.E.2d at 390.
Id.
Id. at 514, 513 N.E.2d at 390.
Id. at 516, 513 N.E.2d at 391.
Id.
Id. at 521, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
119 11. 2d 496, 520 N.E.2d 37 (1988) [hereinafter Johnson].
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strain a patient from leaving the hospital.18 In Johnson, the plaintiff's administrator filed a complaint seeking damages for injuries
to and for the death of Kathleen Johnson. 186 The complaint alleged that Janice Holt, while a patient at Condell Memorial Hospital ("Condell"), obtained a knife, threatened hospital personnel,
and fled the hospital in her car. 8 7 While pursuing Holt, a police
car struck Kathleen
Johnson's automobile, causing her injuries and
88
later death. 1

The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff did not
establish that Condell had a duty to control Holt.' 89 The court
noted that the plaintiff alleged that Holt was a "patient," but did
not specify whether Holt's admission was voluntary or involuntary. 190 The court found this significant because the defendant
owed no duty to a patient who was admitted voluntarily.' 9' The
court held that the plaintiff failed to set out ultimate facts supporting a cause of action and, therefore, the complaint was properly
dismissed. 192
As in Kirk, the court is restricting recovery where the court perceives that it would be unfair to impose a duty. Unless the patient
was known to be dangerous or is a person who might flee a hospital, it does not seem appropriate to make the hospital the virtual
guardian of the patient's behavior. Certainly, there could be circumstances where the imposition of a duty regarding a voluntarily
admitted patient might present a much closer question. Careful
crafting of the complaint must be performed to establish that a
duty would be owed in such a situation.
B.

Medical Malpractice -

Affidavits

Section 2-622 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure

93

requires

185. Id. at 510-11, 520 N.E.2d at 43.
186. Id. at 499, 520 N.E.2d at 37.
187. Id. at 499-500, 520 N.E.2d at 37-38.
188. Id. at 500, 520 N.E.2d at 38.
189. Id. at 509, 520 N.E.2d at 42.
190. Id. at 507, 520 N.E.2d at 41.
191. Id. at 508, 520 N.E.2d at 42.
192. Id. at 510, 520 N.E.2d at 43.
193. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-622 (1987). Section 2-622 provides in part:
(a) In any action.., in which the plaintiff seeks damages for injuries or death
by reason of medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice, the plaintiff's
attorney... shall file an affidavit... declaring one of the following:
1. That the affiant has consulted and reviewed the facts of the case with a
health professional who the affiant reasonably believes is knowledgeable in the
relevant issues involved ....
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a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to attach an affidavit
from his attorney and a report from a health care professional to
his complaint.1 94 In McCastle v. Sheinkop, 195 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that failure to attach such an affidavit and report
would
196
not result in dismissal with prejudice of a complaint.
In McCastle, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that it was
not the legislature's intent to require dismissal with prejudice
under section 2-622.'1 The court also noted that the legislature
did not intend for trial courts to have discretion to grant leave to
file an amended complaint when a plaintiff seeks to amend an affidavit, but not when a plaintiff fails to file an affidavit originally. 19
The court concluded that even though the decision to grant leave
to amend is within the discretion of the trial court, the trial court
dismissed the complaint under the incorrect belief that section 2622 requires dismissal with prejudice.' 99
The court based its decision on legislative history that is somewhat ambiguous as to whether discretion was vested in the court
with regard to dismissal with or without prejudice. The concurrence by Justice Miller indicates that section 2-619(a) of the Code
of Civil Procedure allows a court to entertain "other appropriate
relief," presumably including dismissal without prejudice.
The Illinois General Assembly could have avoided the confusion
and the subsequent need for judicial clarification if it had not stated
194.
195.
196.
the trial
Id.
197.

Id.
121 Ill. 2d 188, 520 N.E.2d 293 (1987).
Id. at 194, 520 N.E.2d at 296. The supreme court remanded the case because
court did not know that it had discretion to grant leave to amend the pleadings.
Id. at 192-93, 520 N.E.2d at 295-96. The following debate occurred in the Illi-

nois House of Representatives:
Representative Preston: . . .What happens in the case after you enter into
discovery, you then find out, which is frequently the situation, that at that point
you want to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where you hadn't discovered that prior to the filing of the complaint?
Representative Daniels: You would amend the complaint with a new consulting physician's report.
Representative Preston: Well, but after discovery has been entered into and
there's been preliminary motions, you then need leave of court, do you not, to
amend the complaint? It's not of right that you can amend the complaint at that
time.
Representative Daniels: You would need leave of court. You would have to
show good cause to the court.
Representative Preston: And the court can deny that, I assume.
Representative Daniels: I think the judge would do the right thing."
HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., May 23, 1985, at 385-86.
198. McCastle, 121 Ill. 2d at 193, 520 N.E.2d at 296.
199. Id. at 194, 520 N.E.2d at 296.
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in section 2-622(g) that the failure to file the required certificates
shall be grounds for dismissal under section 2-619. Whether this
language was written intentionally or as a legislative compromise,
it causes confusion for practitioners. Because discretion now has
been judicially created, if not explicitly contained in the statute,
leave is granted to file a late affidavit or report much more readily.
As a result, much of the strength of the statute, intended by its
sponsors to weed out frivolous claims, has dissipated. Because substantial costs, however, are still involved in retaining a physician to
prepare a report, practitioners are filing fewer small or non-meritorious medical malpractice claims. While non-meritorious claims
are certainly to be discouraged, it is questionable whether it is appropriate to discourage small claims that have merit simply because it is too expensive to retain a physician. Nevertheless, with
the court's opinion in McCastle, plaintiffs at least have additional
time to decide whether a case warrants retaining a physician to
prepare a report.
VIII.

WRITS OF MANDAMUS

A.

Legal Duty

In League of Women Voters v. County of Peoria,2" the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the complaint for writ of mandamus was
properly dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that
they had a clear legal right to the relief requested. 01 In League of
Women Voters, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus compelling the defendants, Peoria County and the county
clerk, to implement and enforce a referendum.2 °2 Upon the defendants' motion, the circuit court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice.2 °3
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendants argued
that the plaintiffs' referendum was not legally enforceable. 2° In
the alternative, the defendants argued that even if the referendum
was enforceable, a writ of mandamus should not issue because
200. 121 Ill. 2d 236, 520 N.E.2d 626 (1987).
201. Id. at 255, 520 N.E.2d at 635.
202. Id. at 239, 520 N.E.2d at 628. The referendum changed the method of electing
county board members and the number of county board members. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 242, 520 N.E.2d at 629. The defendants contended that the referendum
was not enforceable because article IV, section 3(a) of the Illinois Constitution allows
only a county board to determine the number of its members. Id. In addition, the defendants argued that reapportionment does not comport with the "one man, one vote"
constitutional requirement. Id.
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county clerk had a legal duty to impleneither the county nor20 the
5
ment the referendum.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that a mandamus should issue
only where the respondent has a clear duty to act and comply with
the writ. 20 6 Thus, the court noted that the plaintiffs were required
to show that the referendum was valid and that the county and its
clerk had a duty to carry out the actions requested by the plaintiffs. 20 7 The court concluded that the referendum was unenforceable and, therefore, that the plaintiffs had not established a clear
right to the relief sought in the writ of mandamus.20 8
The decision in League of Women Voters indicates again how
cautious the court is of using mandamus power. It is only when a
party makes a clear showing of the right to the relief requested that
the court will allow relief in mandamus.
B. Appeal as a Substitute
In People ex rel Foreman v. Nash,2° the Illinois Supreme Court
refused to grant a writ of mandamus or prohibition or a supervisory order because to do so would, in effect, constitute an additional appeal to which the petitioner was not entitled. 2 ° In Nash,
the defendant had been found guilty but mentally ill on charges of
murder and armed violence. 211 The appellate court reversed and
remanded, directing the entry of judgment of not guilty by reason
of insanity.212 The State then moved to reinstate the original sentence or, in the alternative, to grant a retrial on the ground that the
appellate court did not have authority to issue its order. 213 The
State's motion was denied. 2 4 The State then applied for a writ of
mandamus directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment and
a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to reinstate the defendant's conviction or, alternatively, for a new trial and a writ of
prohibition preventing the circuit court from entering a judgment
of not guilty by reason of insanity. 15
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the State's petition for
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id. at 243, 520 N.E.2d at 629.
Id.
Id. at 254-55, 520 N.E.2d at 635.
118 Ill.
2d 90, 514 N.E.2d 180 (1987).
Id. at 98-99, 514 N.E.2d at 184.
Id. at 92, 514 N.E.2d at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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rehearing in the appellate court was denied and its petition for
leave to appeal to the supreme court was also denied.2 6 Thus, the
court found that permitting the State's writ would, in effect, be
permitting another appeal. 2 7 Therefore, the court denied issuance

of the writs and the supervisory order because they constituted an
improper additional appeal.21 8
As with League of Women Voters, the Illinois Supreme Court
will not allow mandamus to be issued in a manner in which it was
not intended. Practitioners should be aware of this caution on the
part of the court and act accordingly. Only where the right to relief is clear will the mandamus be entertained.
IX.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION

In Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local No. 2,219 the Illinois Supreme Court held that section 2-209.1 of the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure22 ° should be applied prospectively.22 ' In Rivard,
the plaintiffs sought damages from a fire fighters union and an association of fire fighters for deaths and injuries sustained in fires
that occurred when the union was on strike in 1980.222 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that common law did not permit a voluntary, unincorporated association to
be sued in its own name. 2 23 The circuit court granted the defend-

ant's motion and dismissed the case.224
While on appeal, the legislature amended the Illinois Code of
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 98-99, 514 N.E.2d at 184. The Illinois Supreme Court considered its decision in Moore v. Strayhorn, 114 Ill. 2d 538, 502 N.E.2d 727 (1986), as controlling. Nash,
118 Ill. 2d at 98, 514 N.E.2d at 184. In Moore, the defendant applied to the Illinois
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to credit his sentence
with the time served prior to his appeal. Moore, 114 Ill. 2d at 540, 402 N.E.2d at 728.
The Moore court held that the defendant should have appealed to the appellate court
before filing his petition and the failure to do so constituted an attempt to circumvent the
appellate process. Id. Accordingly, the court denied the writ of mandamus. Id.
The Nash court distinguished Moore by noting that, unlike the defendant in Moore, the
State in this case had already appealed directly to the appellate court. Nash, 118 Ill. 2d at
98, 514 N.E.2d at 184.
219. 122 Ill. 2d 303, 522 N.E.2d 1195 (1988).
220. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-209.1 (1987). Section 2-209.1 provides in part:
"A voluntary unincorporated association may sue and be sued in its own name, and may
complain and defend in all actions." Id.
221. Rivard, 122 Ill. 2d at 312, 522 N.E.2d at 1200.
222. Id. at 305, 522 N.E.2d at 1196.
223. Id. at 305, 522 N.E.2d at 1197 (citing American Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs,
Local 144 v. La Jeunesse, 63 Ill. 2d 263, 347 N.E.2d 712 (1976)).
224. Id.
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239

Civil Procedure to permit voluntary, unincorporated associations
to file suit or to be named as defendants.225 Subsequently, the appellate court applied the new provision retroactively and reversed
the circuit court.226
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that, generally, prospective
application of statutes is preferred to retroactive application. 27
The court found that the presumption of prospectivity may be rebutted only by express language to the contrary in the statute itself. 22s Although the court acknowledged that legislative changes
in procedure or remedies will generally be applied retroactively,229
it also determined that section 2-209.1 represents a substantive, not
procedural, statute because it makes certain entities parties to
suits. 230 Accordingly, the court held that because the statute was
substantive and the statute itself did not rebut the presumption of
prospectivity, the statute must be applied prospectively. 3
Such a rule is consistent with the well-recognized principle that
substantive changes in statutes will not be applied retroactively.
There cannot be serious disagreement with the rule or the court's
application of it in this instance.
X.
A.

APPEALS

Rules 304(a) and 303

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) 232 provides that if not all
claims are resolved or not all parties in an action obtain a final
judgment, then a party must file a timely notice of appeal from the
23
time the entry is made.2 33 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) 1
225. Id. at 306, N.E.2d at 1197; P.A. 83-901, 1983 Ill. Laws 5383.
226. Rivard, 122 Ill. 2d at 306, 522 N.E.2d at 1197.
227. Id. at 308-09, 522 N.E.2d at 1198 (citing Orlicki v. McCarthy, 4 Ill. 2d 342, 122
N.E.2d 513 (1954)).
228. Id. at 309, 522 N.E.2d at 1198 (citing People v. Kellick, 102 Ill. 2d 162, 180, 464
N.E.2d 1037, 1045 (1984); United States Steel Credit Union v. Knight, 32 111. 2d 138,
142, 204 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1965)).
229. Id. at 310, 522 N.E.2d at 1198 (citing Maiter v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 82 Ill. 2d
373, 390, 415 N.E.2d 1034, 1042 (1980)).
230. Id. at 311, 522 N.E.2d at 1199.
231. Id. at 312, 522 N.E.2d at 1200.
232. ILL. S. CT. R. 304(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 304(a) (1987).
233. Id. Rule 304(a) states in pertinent part:
If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an
appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all
of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal ....
The
time for filing the notice of appeal shall run from the entry of the required
finding ....
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provides for a notice of appeal to be filed within thirty days after
final judgment has been entered or within thirty days after a posttrial motion has been denied.235 In Elg v. Whittington,236 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the filing of a post-trial motion to
reconsider a piecemeal judgment would not toll the thirty-day period for filing a timely appeal under rule 304(a).2 37 In Elg, the appellants filed a third-party complaint against the appellees.238 The
circuit court entered an order granting the third-party defendants'
motion for summary judgment.239 In addition, the court entered a
finding pursuant to rule 304(a) on its own motion. 24
The appellants subsequently filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment.2 41 The circuit court denied the appellants' motion.242 More than two months after the court entered an order for
summary judgment, but only twenty-six days after the appellants
moved to vacate the judgment, the appellants filed a notice of ap243
peal from the order granting summary judgment.
The appellate court noted that the appellant's motion to reconsider did not toll the time to file their notice of appeal. 244 Accordingly, the appellate court held that because the notice of appeal was
not filed within thirty days of the summary judgment order, the
245
appeal would be dismissed under rule 303(a)(1).
The Illinois Supreme Court distinguished piecemeal appeals
under rule 304 from a standard appeal under rule 303 and determined that the merits of a piecemeal appeal should be decided as
soon as possible so that a resolution of all parties' claims can be
achieved.246 In addition, the court recognized that the purpose of
Id.
234. ILL. S. CT. R. 303(a)(1), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 303(a)(1) (1987).
Section 303(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30
days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial
motion directed against the judgment is filed... within 30 days after the entry
of the order disposing of the last pending post-trial motion.
Id.
235. Id.
236. 119 I11.2d 344, 518 N.E.2d 1232 (1987).
237. Id. at 351, 518 N.E.2d at 1235.
238. Id. at 346, 518 N.E.2d at 1233.
239. Id. at 348-49, 518 N.E.2d at 1234.
240. Id. at 349, 518 N.E.2d at 1234.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 350, 518 N.E.2d at 1234.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 354, 518 N.E.2d at 1236.
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rule 304(a) is to avoid unnecessary appeals, yet permit appeals in
which immediate appeal is appropriate. 4 ' Thus, the court concluded that rule 304(a) should enable litigants to determine, with
certainty, when a judgment of fewer than all claims is appealable.2 4 8 The court also noted that rule 304(a), unlike rule 303, does
not include a provision that the time for filing a notice of appeal
may run from the date of an order denying a post-trial motion.249
The court, therefore, held that a motion to reconsider an order
dismissing fewer than all claims or affecting fewer than all parties
will not toll the time period for filing an appeal.250
Elg is one of the most significant cases decided during the Survey
period. For many practitioners, it changes the rules as to when to
file a notice of appeal and it emphasizes, once again, how important it is for all practitioners in Illinois to know and understand the
Supreme Court Rules.
The court in Elg referred to two tracks of litigation that proceed
when an interlocutory appeal occurs. The supreme court emphasized that it is in the interest of the court and the parties to have
the two tracks merge into one again as quickly as possible. As a
result, there is no tolling period provided for in rule 304(a). A
party must either file a notice of appeal within thirty days or lose
the opportunity to do so. Second, if a party were to file a motion
while jurisdiction still rested with the circuit court, then the motion must be heard within that thirty-day period or the circuit
court would lose jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion.
Section 2-621 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 25 1 permits a
non-manufacturer-defendant to be dismissed from a case once the
product manufacturer has been identified and sued.252 In Keller247.

Id. at 353, 518 N.E.2d at 1236.

248.

Id.

249. Id. at 351, 518 N.E.2d at 1235.
250. Id. In addition, the court found that its decision resolved an issue of first impression and held that its decision will apply prospectively to all cases in which a notice
of appeal was filed on or after November 16, 1987. Id. at 358-59, 518 N.E.2d at 1238-39.
Subsequently, the supreme court amended rule 304(a), effective January 1, 1989. The
time for filing a notice of appeal under rule 304(a) is now the same as under rule 303.
Once the express finding is made by the court, the time for filing the notice of appeal
begins to elapse. The filing of a post-judgment motion will toll the time to file a notice of
appeal. When the post-judgment motion is decided, a party shall have 30 days to file a
notice of appeal.
251.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-621 (1987).

252. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-621(b) (1987). Section 2-621(b) provides in
pertinent part:
Once the plaintiff has filed a complaint against the manufacturer or manufacturer . . . the court shall order the dismissal of a strict liability in tort claim
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man v. Crowe,2" the Illinois Supreme Court held that an order
granting dismissal under section 2-621 was not final and, therefore,
a finding under rule 304(a) would be inappropriate.254 In Kellerman, the plaintiffs filed complaints for mandamus seeking damages
for certain deaths resulting from the ingestion of cyanide-laced aspirin capsules.255 The complaints named the product manufacturer and certain retail stores as defendants.256 The trial judge
granted the retailers' motion to dismiss under section 2-621 and
issued an order under rule 304(a).257 The plaintiffs subsequently
alleged that the trial judge was without authority to make the orders appealable under rule 304(a).258
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that in order for a judgment
to be final and appealable, it must terminate all litigation between
the parties on the merits and eliminate the rights of a party.25 9 The
court, however, concluded that a dismissal under section 2-621
does not dispose of a party's rights because it contemplates further
litigation. 26 The court stated that section 2-621(b) contemplates
further litigation because a plaintiff may move to have a dismissal
order vacated against the manufacturer if the statute of limitations
has run, the incorrect manufacturer was certified by the defendant,
the manufacturer could not be served, or the manufacturer would
not be able to satisfy a judgment. 26' The court held that because a

dismissal under 2-621 does not dispose of the party's rights, an
order granting a motiofi for dismissal under 2-621 should not be
final.262
against the certifying defendant or defendants . . . . The plaintiff may at any
time subsequent to the dismissal move to vacate the order of dismissal and reinstate the certifying defendant or defendants, provided plaintiff can show one or
more of the following:
(1) That the applicable period of statute of limitation or repose bars the assertion of strict liability in tort cause of action...
(2) That the manufacturer no longer exists, cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, or despite due diligence, the manufacturer is not
amenable to service of process; or
(3) That the manufacturer is unable to satisfy any judgment ....
Id.
253. 119 Ill. 2d 111, 518 N.E.2d 116 (1987).
254. Id. at 115, 518 N.E.2d at 118.
255. Id. at 113, 518 N.E.2d at 117.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 114, 518 N.E.2d at 118. The plaintiffs contended that the findings were
unnecessary and encouraged piecemeal appeals. Id.
259. Id. at 115, 518 N.E.2d at 118.
260. Id. at 116, 518 N.E.2d at 118.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 115, 518 N.E.2d at 118. In addition, with regard to filing a petition for
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This ruling comports with reality. Because a defendant can be
brought back into the action at a later time, the dismissal actually
is not a final order. The drawback, however, is that it renders this
very practical statute less practical if a defendant is unable to be
dismissed finally and permanently. The only suggestion to be
made, which does not appear to be authorized or prohibited by the
court's opinion, is for a defendant to wait until the correct manufacturer has been brought into the case, thereby resolving any concerns that a defendant will be brought back into the action. At
that point, a motion could be made requesting the court to make a
rule 304(a) finding so that a defendant finally may be eliminated
from the case.
In Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway Co. ,263 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a finding under rule 304(a) was necessary to appeal a judgment as to a severed issue, unless the trial
court states in its severance orders that the claim, counterclaim, or
party has been severed and will proceed separately. 26 In Carter,
the plaintiff's appeals were consolidated and later severed by the
appellate court while awaiting for the supreme court to decide
writ of mandamus, the court found that a mandamus should not be substituted for appeal
and that the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy would be an appeal to the appellate court. Id.
at 118, 518 N.E.2d at 120.
263. 119 Ill. 2d 296, 518 N.E.2d 1031 (1988).
264. Id. at 307-08, 518 N.E.2d at 1037. In Carter, the plaintiff sought damages for
the wrongful death of his wife and daughter who were killed in an automobile accident by
the defendant's train. Id. at 297, 518 N.E.2d at 1032. After the jury awarded damages
for the death of the wife and daughter, the trial court found that the amount of damages
for the daughter's death was inadequate. Id. A new trial was set to determine the damages for the daughter's death. Id. Upon securing a special finding by the trial court
under rule 304(a), the plaintiff appealed from a reduced judgment on the verdict as to his
wife's wrongful death. Id. at 298, 518 N.E.2d at 1032. The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's decision. Id.
The defendant filed a counterclaim against the wife's estate for damages pending in the
action concerning the claim for the daughter's wrongful death. Id. at 298, 518 N.E.2d at
1033. The plaintiff's subsequent motion to sever the counterclaim was granted. Id.
Following a verdict for the daughter's estate, the defendant's post-trial motion was
denied and the defendant requested, and was granted, a special finding of appealability
under rule 304(a). Id. Subsequently, the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaim
was granted. Id. at 299, 518 N.E.2d at 1033. The defendant's appeal from the judgment
for the daughter's estate was based on rule 304(a) because, at the time, the defendant's
counterclaim was still pending. Id. The defendants also appealed from the dismissal of
the counterclaim based on rule 303 because dismissal of the counterclaim had terminated
the litigation. Id.
The appellate court found the sequencing of events relevant. Id. The defendant's motion as to the judgment in favor of the daughter's estate was denied on February 14, 1985.
Id. The special finding as to that claim was entered on March 28, 1985. Id. The appeal
was taken pursuant to the rule 304(a) finding, but more than 30 days after denial of the
defendant's post-trial motion. Id.
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Northtown Warehouse & TransportationCo. v. TransamericaInsurance Co.265 Following the supreme court's decision, the appellate
court then found Northtown controlling and concluded that it had
no jurisdiction over the Carter case because the defendant did not
appeal within thirty days of the denial of a post trial motion under
rule 303.266
The Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the appellate
court correctly applied Northtown. In Northtown, the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that a trial court's severance of a counter267
claim created a separate and distinct claim from the plaintiff's.
Thus, an appeal from a final judgment in a severed action should
be allowed without a finding under rule 304(a). 6
The Carter
court found that in Carter, unlike in Northtown, there was a rule
304(a) finding, but the appeal was dismissed because the notice of
appeal was not filed within thirty days.2 69 The Carter court noted
that Northtown did not specifically hold that an appeal must be
taken only within the time required in rule 303(a).27° The court
reasoned that the holding in Northtown would require every losing
party in a claim tried separately to file an appeal under rule 303 to
protect against the possibility of a determination that the severance
order may have created a separate action where judgment is appealable without a rule 304(a) finding.2"
Additionally, the court found that a finding under rule 304(a) is
necessary in order to appeal a judgment as to a severed issue, unless the trial court, in its severance order, states that the claim,
counterclaim, or party has been severed and will 272
proceed separately from other claims, counterclaims, or parties.
B.

Waiver -

Opportunity To Litigate

In Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation,
265. Id. at 299, 518 N.E.2d at 1033 (citing Northtown Warehouse & Transp. Co. v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 111 Ill. 2d 532, 490 N.E.2d 1268 (1986) [hereinafter Northtown]).
In Northtown, the court held that a counterclaim for indemnity severed in the trial court
created a separate and distinct claim from that of the plaintiff. Northtown, 111 Ill 2d at
537-38, 490 N.E.2d at 1271. Accordingly, the court determined that a defendant's claim,
when severed, is treated as a separate action. Id.
266. Carter, 119 Ill. 2d at 300, 518 N.E.2d at 1033-34.
267. Northtown, 111 Ill. 2d at 537, 490 N.E.2d at 1270.
268. Id.
269. Carter, 119 I11.2d at 301, 518 N.E.2d at 1034.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 304, 518 N.E.2d at 1035.
272. Id. at 307-08, 518 N.E.2d at 1037.
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Inc.,27 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the State does not
waive its right to appeal when the Attorney General is not a party
to a trial court proceeding and is denied leave to intervene in the
appellate court.274 In Spinelli, the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated appeals in three actions involving the constitutionality of an
act that permits employees to review personnel records (the
"Act"). 27 The Attorney General contended that he was not aware
of the pendency of the action in the circuit court and, therefore, the
State should not be denied its right to appeal because he had no
opportunity to litigate. 276 The Illinois Supreme Court found that
because the Attorney General was not aware of the pending action
in the circuit court and was denied leave to intervene in the appellate court, the State could not have waived the issue because the
2 77
Attorney General had not had an opportunity to raise an issue.
XI.

SETTLEMENT AND CONTRIBUTION

In Hall v. Archer-Daniels-MidlandCo.,2 78 the Illinois Supreme

Court held that a settling tortfeasor need not extinguish an
jured's workers' compensation lien before filing a contribution
tion against the injured's employer.279 In Hall, the plaintiff,
wife of an injured construction worker, sought damages under

inacthe
the

Structural Work Act 28 ° for injuries sustained to the worker. 28 1 In

her complaint, the plaintiff sought recovery against Archer-Daniels-Midland ("ADM") and Midstates. 28 2 ADM then filed a third-

party complaint for contribution against the injured's employer,
273. 118 Ill. 2d 389, 515 N.E.2d 1222 (1987).
274. Id. at 400, 515 N.E.2d at 1227.
275. Id. at 395, 515 N.E.2d at 1225 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 2001-2012
(1987)).
276. Id. at 400, 515 N.E.2d at 1227.
277. Id. The court also noted that since the action was filed, the supreme court
adopted rule 19, which requires litigants to serve the Attorney General with notice that
he or she intends to challenge the constitutionality of a statute. Id. (citing ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, para. 19 (1987)).
Additionally, the court found that the defendant's waiver of the issue did not preclude
the State from raising the issue in the supreme court. Id. at 400-01, 515 N.E.2d at 1227.
Yet, the court found that because the State failed to adequately brief or argue the issue in
the supreme court, the issue had been waived. Id. at 401, 515 N.E.2d at 1227.
278. 122 Ill. 2d 448, 524 N.E.2d 586 (1988).
279. Id. at 454, 524 N.E.2d at 589.
280. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 60-69 (1987).
281. Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 450, 524 N.E.2d at 587.
282. Id. ADM was the company in charge of the construction project where her
husband was injured and Midstates was the company that erected an allegedly defective
catwalk. Id.
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Corrigan Co., under the Contribution Act.28 3
Eventually, the plaintiff and ADM entered into a settlement
agreement whereby the plaintiff released all parties in exchange for
a payment and indemnification by ADM for a workers' compensation lien claim by the employer. 2 4 The settlement was approved

by the trial judge, and the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with
prejudice.285
In a separate proceeding, ADM pursued its contribution action
against Midstates and Corrigan. 2 86 A jury found in favor of ADM
against both defendants. 2 7 The jury then apportioned the parties'

respective shares of contribution, and the amount of the workers'
compensation award was added to the settlement amount. 8 8 A
judgment in a proportionate amount was entered against the
parties.28 9
The appellate court reversed, finding that ADM failed to satisfy
section 302(e) of the Contribution Act.29° Section 302(e) provides
that a tortfeasor who settles with a claimant is not entitled to recover from another tortfeasor who has not extinguished liability by
the settlement. 29 1 The appellate court reasoned that under section

302(e), ADM would have to extinguish all of Corrigan's liability,
including the workers' compensation lien, before bringing a contribution claim against Corrigan.292
The Illinois Supreme Court determined that under the Contribution Act, a settling party is not required to eliminate every obligation, including workers' compensation benefits, that the
contribution defendant owes to the injured plaintiff.293 The court

noted that the Contribution Act's consistent use of the terms "liability" and "culpability" indicates that the legislature wanted to
include only liability obtained from negligent or culpable con283. Id. at 450, 524 N.E.2d at 587 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 301-305
(1987)).
284. Id. at 450-51, 524 N.E.2d at 587.
285. Id. at 451, 524 N.E.2d at 587.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 451, 524 N.E.2d at 587-88.
290. Id; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(e) (1987). Section 302(e) states: "[a]
tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to para. (c) is not entitled to recover
contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability is not extinguished by the settlement." Id.
291. ILL. REV, STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(e) (1987).
292. Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 453, 524 N.E.2d at 589.
293. Id. at 454, 524 N.E.2d at 589.
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duct. 294 The court reasoned that because the obligation of an employer under the Workers' Compensation Act is based on status
alone and not on the culpability of the employer, the workers' compensation benefits were not intended to fall within the meaning of
the Contribution Act.295
The status of an employer, whether under the Workers' Compensation Act or in a contribution action, always presents a problem for the court. The court's opinion in Hall is based, at least in
part, on the reluctance of the court to interfere with a settlement
reached at arms' length by the parties. Because an employer is a
joint tortfeasor who can be sued for contribution based upon culpable conduct, there does seem to be a problem with the court's conclusion that section 302(e) does not apply. This is true because the
workers' compensation lien is used to reduce the judgment against
the employer. The strong public policy in favor of settlements
would seem to outweigh any such concern, however.
XII.

AMIcus BRIEFS

In Zurich Insurance v. Raymark Industries,296 the Illinois
Supreme Court denied a motion by an amicus curiae to strike other
amicus briefs.297 In Zurich, Zurich Insurance Company ("Zurich"), Federal Insurance Company ("Federal"), and Commercial
Union Insurance ("Commercial") sought a declaratory judgment
concerning their obligations to indemnify Raymark against
thousands of personal injury and wrongful death claims brought
against Raymark.2 98 Several amicus briefs were filed, including
those of the U.S. Gypsum Company ("Gypsum"), Armstrong
World Industries, Inc. ("Armstrong"), and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty"). 299 Zurich, Federal, and Commercial
294. Id. at 454-55, 524 N.E.2d at 589.
295. Id. at 455, 524 N.E.2d at 589. The court also found that, contrary to the contention of Corrigan and Midstates, ADM should not be precluded from bringing a contribution action, even though the release did not specify certain separate amounts for the
settlement of the two claims against ADM. Id. at 459, 524 N.E.2d at 591-92. The court
noted that allocation of settlement proceeds between different theories of recovery is not
expressly required by the Contribution Act. Id. at 459, 524 N.E.2d at 592. The court
found that, in any event, Corrigan and Midstates failed to challenge the good faith settlement at the trial court and therefore, waived their argument. Id. at 460, 524 N.E.2d at
592. In addition, the court found that ADM presented a prima facie case for contribution because the settlement was reached in good faith and ADM paid more than its share
of liability, as determined by the jury. Id. at 461, 524 N.E.2d at 592.
296. 118 I11.2d 23, 514 N.E.2d 150 (1987) [hereinafter Zurich].
297. Id. at 60, 514 N.E.2d at 167.
298. Id. at 58, 514 N.E.2d at 152.
299. Id. at 58-59, 514 N.E.2d at 166.
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moved to strike Gypsum and Armstrong's amicus briefs, alleging
that Gypsum and Armstrong's briefs improperly attempted to supplement the record. 3" Subsequently, Liberty also moved to strike
Gypsum and Armstrong's briefs.301
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that because Liberty was
not a party to the court action, it was only permitted to advise or
make suggestions to the court.30 2 The court, therefore, found that
Liberty, as an amicus, was not permitted to engage in motion practice. 30 3 Accordingly, the court held that the motion to strike was
inappropriate."
This ruling is consistent with the limited purpose of amicus curiae. Practitioners should be careful not to abuse the privilege of
advising the court by seeking to become an active litigant.
XIII.

LEGISLATION

A.

New or Modified Supreme Court Rules
Effective November 25, 1987, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63305
was amended by the addition of subsection (B)(5). Amended rule
63(B)(5) provides that a judge must refrain from voting to appoint
or reappoint a spouse or close relative to the office of associate
judge.30 6 In addition, subparagraph (C)(1)(c) was amended, effective August 1, 1987. Amended rule 63(C)(1)(c) provides that a
judge should disqualify himself or herself when the judge was,
within the past three years, associated with the attorney or law
firm involved in a matter presently before the judge.30 7 In addition,
a judge may not rule on a matter if, within the past seven years, he
or she represented one of the present parties while engaged in private practice.30 8
B.

New or Modified Illinois Code of Civil Procedure Sections

1. Section 2-103: Where Public Corporations May Be Sued
In an effort to expand the number of counties in which an action
may be brought against a public corporation, section 2-103 of the
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 59, 514 N.E.2d at 166.
Id.
Id. at 59-60, 514 N.E.2d at 166-67.
Id. at 60, 514 N.E.2d at 167.
Id. at 59-60, 514 N.E.2d at 167.
ILL. S. CT. R. 63, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63 (1987).
ILL. S. CT. R. 63(B)(5), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63(B)(5) (1987).
ILL. S. CT. R. 63(C)(1)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 63(C)(1)(c) (1987).
Id.
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Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 30 9 was amended to permit public
corporations to be sued in the county where the transaction or part
of the transaction occurred. 30 Effective November 6, 1987, the
amended section treats public corporations like other defendants
under section 2-101 of the Illinois Code of Civil*Procedure. 3 "
2.

Section 2-202: Service of Process

Effective November 23, 1987, Public Act 85-907 amended section 2-202 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure3 1 2 to expand the
class of persons permitted to serve process.313 Subsection (a) provides that registered employees of a certified private agency may
serve process without special appointment in counties with a population of less than one million.31 4
3.

Section 2-401: Designation of Parties

Section 2-401 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 31 5 was
amended by Public Act 85-990 to permit a party, upon application
3 16
and for good cause, to appear under a fictitious name.
4.

Section 8-802: Physician Disclosure

Section 8-802 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 317 as
amended by Public Act 85-992, prohibits a physician or surgeon
from disclosing information acquired in attending a patient professionally.31 8 In addition, several exceptions are provided. Effective
January 5, 1988, a physician is permitted to disclose such information in prosecutions in which written blood alcohol test results are
admissible under section 11-501.4 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.319
309. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-103 (1987).
310. P.A. 85-887, 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-887 (West).
311. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-103(a) (1987).
312. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-202 (1987).
313. 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-907 (West) (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
202(a) (1987)).
314. Id.
315. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-401 (1987).
316. 1987 IlL. Legis. Serv. 85-907 (West) (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
401(e) (1987) (effective November 23, 1987)).
317. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802 (1987).
318. 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-992 (West) (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
802 (1987)).
319. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802(a) (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
para. 11-501.4 (1987).

para. 2-

para. 2-

para. 895 1/2,
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Section 8-2101: Municipal Health Information Privilege

Effective January 1, 1988, section 8-2101 of the Illinois Code of
Civil Procedure includes municipal health department information
in information that is privileged and confidential.32 °
6.

Section 8-2102: Admissibility of Section 8-2101 Evidence

Section 8-2102 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 32' provides that the information in section 8-2101 shall not be admissible
as evidence or discoverable.322 The amended section provides that
the disclosure of such information will not waive its confidentiality,
non-discoverability, or non-admissibility.323
7.

Section 13-214.2: Accounting Malpractice
32 4
New Section 13-214.2 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure
became effective on September 20, 1987.325 The section provides
that actions against any person or entity under the Illinois Public
Accounting Act 326 or any of its employees, partners, members, officers, or shareholders, for an action in professional malpractice,
must be brought within two years from the time the petitioner
knew or should have known of the act or omission.327 In addition,
the action may not be brought more than five years after the date
on which the act or omission occurred.328
XIV.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey period, the Illinois Supreme Court assessed
the application of statutes of limitations and analyzed various dismissals under Supreme Court Rule 103(b). In addition, the court
decided cases concerning jurisdictional questions and, specifically,
those cases concerning the propriety of judicial review and authority. The court also discussed standards for standing and mootness.
In addition, the supreme court considered various cases concerning
320. 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-655 (West) (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 82101 (1987)).
321. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2102 (1987).
322. Id.
323. 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-655 (West) (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 82102 (1987)).
324. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214.2 (1987).
325. 1987 Il. Legis. Serv. 85-655 (West) (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para.
13-214.2 (1987)).
326. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5500.01 (1987).
327. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214.2(a) (1987).
328. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214.2(b) (1987).
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rule 303 and rule 304(a) appeals. Also during the Survey period,
the Illinois Supreme Court amended certain Supreme Court Rules
affecting judges' responsibilities.
In addition, The Illinois General Assembly effected various
changes in statutory law. These changes affected service of process, confidentiality of medical information, and statutes of
limitations.

